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Do financial investors affect the price of wheat? 
 
DANIELE GIRARDI* 
 
 
 
Following a dramatic surge in financial investment in commodity 
derivatives markets by institutional investors, hedge funds and large 
investment banks, agricultural commodity prices started to fluctuate 
together in an unprecedented fashion. In June 2008 all main agricultural 
prices peaked at their highest level in 30 years, and then fell sharply in 
the next six months. In 2010 there was a new steep rise, with prices 
peaking in early 2011 at levels higher than those reached in 2008. A 
worldwide debate has erupted over the role of financial speculation in 
driving these price dynamics. 
The hypothesis put forward by several observers goes as follows: 
during the last decade financial investors significantly increased their 
investments in commodity futures markets, influencing the formation of 
futures prices, which are the benchmark for spot prices. In particular, 
financial actors had been buying large amounts of futures contracts 
between 2004 and 2008, putting a huge upwards pressure on prices. Then 
they temporarily exited those markets between late 2008 and early 2009, 
selling the contracts they held and causing the fall in prices. They started 
being bullish again from mid-2009, triggering the new price peak of 
2010-2011. If this hypothesis holds true, then the policy implication is 
that new regulatory measures are needed in order to curb excessive 
speculation on commodity derivatives markets. 
Although this theory seems convincing, the underlying evidence is still 
not clear-cut. Some empirical results have been presented (for example by 
Gilbert, 2009; Tang and Xiong, 2010; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2010) which 
suggest that financial speculation affected recent agricultural commodity 
price dynamics, but conclusive evidence is still to be found. In my view this 
is due to a lack of information about commodity derivatives markets (fairly 
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reliable data about trading volumes and net positions of each category of 
traders are only available for U.S. centralized exchanges and only for the 
2006-2011 period) and to the fact that time-series are still relatively short, 
due to the novelty of the phenomenon. This article aims to contribute to the 
debate by presenting some reflections on the financialization of agricultural 
commodities (section 2) and new empirical evidence (section 4) to support 
the hypothesis that financial investors, and in particular index traders, have 
affected wheat price dynamics in recent years. 
 
 
 
1. Recent agricultural commodity price dynamics 
 
 
The   long   phase   of   stability   and   moderation   of   agricultural 
commodity prices, which started in the eighties, ended abruptly in the 
second half of the last decade. The sharp price increases in 2007-2008 
and  2010-2011,  and  the  even  quicker  fall  in  prices  that  took  place 
between the two spikes, were surprisingly rapid and deep. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Agricultural commodity prices on the international market 
(January 1980=100) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on IMF data (Primary Commodity Prices Database). 
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In one and a half years – between January 2007 and June 2008 – all 
main agricultural prices rose sharply, reaching their highest levels in thirty 
years. The wheat price increased by 78%, corn by 75%, rice by 166% and 
soybeans by 116%. During the following six months, from July until 
December 2008, prices fell sharply: wheat declined by 37%, corn by 45%, 
rice by 34%, and soybeans by 42%. A new surge has been observed since 
spring 2010, with prices peaking in early 2011 at levels similar to those 
reached in 2008. Since mid-2011, prices appear to have been declining again. 
These price swings were shared not only by all agricultural 
commodities – a fact not completely surprising, given the strong 
substitution effects which exist between some of them – but even by 
energy and metal commodities (see figure 2). The key feature of these price 
trends is that they do not appear to be fundamental-driven, since offer and 
demand dynamics were not (and probably cannot be) so volatile in the 
short term. Even if during the 2000s an overall cereal production deficit 
was observed in six years out of ten, if we stick to the data made available 
by the FAO and the USDA, physical market fundamentals do not appear to 
justify the steep price increases of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011. In these 
years there was no particular consumption peak, nor a significant fall in 
production. Indeed, main exporters’ stocks did not show a clear downwards 
trend (see figure 3). Cereals’ stocks declined between 2006 and 2008, but 
not so steeply to fully justify the dramatic rise in prices; indeed, in 2008 
cereals’ stocks were broadly at the same level as in 2003. 
 
 
 
2. The boom cycle of commodity derivatives markets 
 
 
It is widely debated whether recent commodity price dynamics were 
affected by financial speculation. The hypothesis goes as follows: during 
the  last  decade  financial  investors  significantly  i ncreased  their 
investments in commodity futures markets, influencing the formation of 
futures prices, which are the benchmark for spot prices. In particular, 
financial actors were buying large amounts of futures contracts between 
2004 and 2008, placing a huge upwards pressure on prices. They then 
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temporarily exited those markets   between late   2008 and early 2009, 
selling the contracts  they held  and causing the rapid fall of prices. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Agricultural, energy and metal commodity prices on 
international markets (2005 = 100) 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on IMF data (Primary Commodity Prices Database). 
 
Figure 3 – Major exporters’ stock-to-disappearance ratio1 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on FAO estimates (FAO, 2011). 
 
 
1 Disappearance is defined by the FAO as domestic utilization plus exports for any given 
season. 
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They started being bullish again from mid 2009, triggering the new 
price peak of 2010-2011. The remainder of this section will delve into 
this hypothesis, while section 4 presents some new empirical evidence in 
support of it. 
 
2.1. A “wall of money” flowing into commodities 
 
 
As a matter of fact, during the 2000s financial investors flooded 
commodity futures markets with what many observers called a “wall of 
money”. This was part of a larger shift in portfolio strategy that drove 
financial institutions away from traditional equity markets and towards 
commodity and real estate derivatives (Basu and Gavin, 2011). The rise 
of financial investment in commodity derivatives started in the aftermath 
of the 2000-2002 financial crisis, triggered by the burst of the dotcom 
bubble. 2007 saw a further huge acceleration of commodity derivatives 
growth as financial capitals were distancing themselves from the 
collapsing US housing market. Between 2004 and 2008, the notional 
amount2  of commodity derivatives traded OTC grew by an impressive 
900% and the number of contracts traded in organized exchanges 
increased by a no less remarkable 214%. In late 2008 there was a fall in 
commodity derivatives trading, both OTC and centralized, as financial 
institutions were selling their assets in an attempt to get liquid and cover 
losses during the financial crises. The slump was reversed in late 2009 
when a new surge of financial investments in commodities began. The 
number of futures contracts traded in commodity exchanges fell by 20% 
between March and December 2008. The number then started rising 
again and by summer 2010 it had reached a new high, 71 percentage 
points higher than the previous peak of spring 2008. According to the 
most recent available data, published in December 2011 by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), a new declining trend seems to have 
started in late 2011. Notional amounts of over-the-counter transactions 
reached  their  peak  in  spring  2008  and  then  fell  by  67%  during  the 
 
2  According to the BIS, “[n]ominal or notional amounts outstanding are defined as the 
gross nominal or notional value of all deals concluded and not yet settled on the reporting 
date” (Bank for International Settlements, 2011). 
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following six months. The declining trend has reversed since the second 
half of 2010 but notional amounts remained well below the 2008 peak; it 
is probable that the new increase was driven by the spike in commodity 
prices rather than by a new increase in the number of transactions 
(notional amounts are determined both by the number of contracts traded 
and by the price of the underlying commodity – see notes 2 and 3). 
In conclusion, we can distinguish an initial commodity derivatives 
boom cycle (2007-2008) and a second cycle (2010-2011). The first cycle 
was characterized by an increase in OTC transactions higher than that in 
contracts traded in centralized exchanges, while in the second cycle it 
was the growth of exchange-traded derivatives that was more relevant.3 
In both cases the boom in commodity derivatives trading coincided with 
a peak in international commodity prices. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Amounts outstanding of over-the-counter commodity 
derivatives (billions of US dollars, half-yearly observations, last 
observation June 2011) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on BIS data (BIS, 2011). 
 
 
 
3 We can infer this distinction from BIS data (see figures 4 and 5) even though the data 
are not completely comparable, because the notional amounts of contracts traded OTC is 
influenced not only by the number of contracts traded but also by the price fluctuations of 
the underlying commodity. 
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Figure 5 – Commodities’ derivative financial instruments traded on 
organized exchanges (millions of contracts, quarterly observations, last 
observation September 2011) 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on BIS data (BIS, 2011). 
 
 
 
2.2. The actors in commodity futures markets 
 
 
We can distinguish three main types of actors in commodity 
derivatives markets, depending on the aims and strategies they exhibit. 
Commercial operators trade commodity derivatives in order to hedge their 
transactions on the spot market, while financial investors are motivated by 
the search for yields and/or by portfolio diversification strategies. Financial 
investors operating in commodity markets can be divided into two 
categories, which we call commodity index traders and money managers. 
Commodity index traders are passive agents whose aim is to gain exposure 
to commodities as an asset class. They do so by tracking a commodity 
index, which is a weighted average of different commodity prices, with 
fixed weights (mainly) dependent on world production and updated once a 
year. To invest in commodity indices, investors buy financial instruments 
whose value is proportional to the value of the indices. These instruments – 
swap agreements, ETFs and ETNs – are typically offered by large financial 
institutions. These institutions buy commodity futures contracts in order to 
hedge their commitment with their clients. By contrast, we term “money 
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managers” any financial investors who do not track a commodity index, 
but  instead  actively  buy  and  sell  futures  contracts  in  an  attempt  to 
anticipate price changes. 
These categories are to be seen as dynamic rather than static. In real 
futures markets, there is no clear-cut distinction between hedging and 
speculation. Rather, there is a continuum between pure hedging and 
speculation. Often big commercial operators carry out speculative 
operations; at the same time, complex speculative strategies followed by 
financial institutions can sometimes bring the latter to trade on physical 
markets. Furthermore, there are cases in which the same trader runs 
multiple lines of business, blurring the distinction between index traders 
and money managers. 
 
2.3. Structural change in agricultural futures markets’ composition and 
the rise of index trading 
 
During the last decade, the remarkable influx of financial speculative 
investment has drastically changed the composition of commodity futures 
markets. Fairly reliable data about trading volumes and net positions of 
each category of traders are only available for U.S. centralized exchanges 
and only for the 2006-2011 period.4 However, the growth in commodity 
derivatives trading was so steep that only speculative investments could 
have triggered it, because physical production did not grow at similar 
rates; so the huge new demand for futures contracts cannot have come 
from commercial operators trying to hedge their physical markets’ 
operations. Better Markets, a nonprofit organization, roughly calculated 
that in the period 2005-2008 commodity index funds alone pumped as 
much as 300 billion dollars into US commodity futures markets, and that 
the market share of financial speculators in the Chicago Board Of Trade 
wheat futures market rose from 12% of the market in 1996 to 65% in 
2008, with the hedging of producers and purchasers dropping to 35%. 
The composition of the futures market is important because it 
determines the relative importance of  the different factors that affect 
 
4  This information is made available by the CFTC. For years prior to 2006, the CFTC’s 
data is such that a considerable part of index traders are classified as commercial hedgers. 
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futures   prices.   Money   managers’   demand   for   commodity   futures 
contracts is a function of their own expectations about the future 
fluctuations of prices and of the present and future returns of the other 
financial markets in which they operate, while commercial hedgers’ 
demand is a function of physical production and consumption of the 
commodity. Index traders’ demand depends on their own expectations 
about the future returns of the commodity index they are tracking, and on 
the present and future fluctuations of the other financial markets in which 
they operate. That is why a futures market dominated by financial 
speculators can disconnect prices from physical market fundamentals, 
linking them instead to financial investors’ expectations about their own 
collective behavior (the “beauty contest” described by Keynes, 1936) and 
to other financial markets’ dynamics. 
According to the data made available by the US market authority 
(CFTC), in the period 2006-2011 financial speculators held on average 
a market share of more than 50% in all main US agricultural exchanges 
(see figure 6). The large majority of this financial investment came 
from commodity index funds. At first glance this could seem counter- 
intuitive, given that agricultural commodities are present in commodity 
indices with only small weightings. Indeed, it is energy commodities 
and in particular crude oil that lead the indices and consequently attract 
the greatest part of the financial inflow. But we have to consider that (1) 
commodity index funds’ total investment has been so huge that even a 
small fraction of it corresponds to a great amount of capital; (2) 
agricultural futures markets are less liquid than energy futures markets, 
so they are less able to absorb capital inflows; (3) commodity index 
traders follow a strategy of buying futures contracts and then holding 
them for a long time, substituting each near-maturity contract with the 
next; this means that they take almost only long positions, in such a way 
that their net position on the market is always positive, and almost as 
high as their trading volume (while money managers’ net position is 
significantly lower than their trading volume, because opposite bets 
offset each other). 
The fact that commodity index traders’ net position tends to be high 
compared to that of other types of traders implies that these financial 
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actors tend to exert a huge impact on futures prices. Indeed, if we accept 
the fact that the overall net position of a group of traders is a proxy for its 
price impact, it follows that commodity index traders were the category 
that exerted the greatest impact on agricultural futures prices in the period 
2006-2011 (see figure 6). 
 
 
2.4. The relation between spot and futures prices 
 
 
The strong connection between spot prices and futures prices means 
that the impact of index traders’ investment was felt not only by 
commercial hedgers operating on commodity futures markets, but also by 
food consumers around the world. Spot and futures prices are linked by 
arbitrage  links,  by  the  price  discovery  function  and  by  the  hedging 
activity of producers and purchasers. No-arbitrage implies that the futures 
price  equals  the  spot  price  augmented  by  the  cost  of  carry5    and 
diminished by the convenience yield.6 But we do not necessarily need to 
assume no-arbitrage to state that there is a strong link between spot and 
futures prices. Futures markets were created in order to let commercial 
traders hedge their physical transactions (the “hedging function”) and to 
discover a price to be used as a benchmark for spot prices (the “price 
discovery function”). The “hedging function” implies that for commercial 
operators the futures price is the price that they will actually receive (or 
pay) for their physical transactions, as long as they hedged those 
transactions  on  the  futures  market.  The  “price  discovery  function” 
implies that futures prices are used as a benchmark for spot prices. This is 
confirmed by empirical analysis. In particular, Hernandez and Torero 
(2010) showed that futures and spot prices of main agricultural 
commodities are highly correlated, and that changes in futures prices tend 
to lead changes in spot prices. 
 
 
 
 
5  Which in the case of agricultural commodities is equal to the opportunity cost (i.e. the 
riskless interest rate) plus the cost of storage. 
6   The  convenience  yield  is  the  major  utility  resulting  from  holding  the  physical 
commodity  instead  of  a  futures  contract  for  the  same  amount,  given  that  physical 
inventories offer insurance against sudden supply disruptions. 
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Table 1 – Commodity futures markets, actors and instruments 
 
 
 
COMMERCIAL 
SPECULATORS 
HEDGERS MONEY 
MANAGERS 
COMMODITY 
INDEX TRADERS 
 
 
Who they 
are 
Physical market 
operators (big 
producers, elevators, 
Individual investors 
or investment funds 
(e.g. hedge funds). 
Big investment banks 
which sell Commodity 
Index   Funds   to   their 
  large scale purchasers)  clients   
 
 
 
 
Aims 
Minimize risks linked 
to price variations, to 
which they are 
exposed because of 
their commercial 
operations on the 
physical markets. 
 
 
Profit from future 
price changes 
To hedge their 
commitment with their 
clients, to whom they 
pay a cash flow linked 
to the returns of the 
commodity index. 
 
 
 
 
 
Net 
aggregate 
position on 
the futures 
market 
Their aggregate net 
position is 
traditionally negative, 
because they are 
mainly big producers 
and elevators (even 
some big purchasers 
trade futures contracts, 
albeit on a minor 
scale). 
Usually not so ample 
compared to their 
trading volume. Its 
sign change depends 
on expectations about 
future price changes. 
Necessarily positive and 
almost equal to their 
trading volume. In other 
words, they tend to take 
only long positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand 
function 
Their demand for 
futures contracts is a 
function of physical 
market fundamentals 
(demand and supply of 
the physical 
commodity). 
Their demand for 
futures contracts is a 
function of their 
expectations about 
the future price 
movements and the 
returns of the other 
financial markets in 
which they invest. 
Inelastic to the price of 
each single commodity 
in which they invest, 
their demand is sensitive 
to the returns of the 
tracked commodity 
index and to the returns 
of other financial 
markets. 
90   
 
 
Figure 6 – Futures market composition (net positions %), 2006-20117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wheat 
Futures 
 
Chicago 
Board of 
Trade 
Wheat 
Futures 
Kansas 
City Board 
of Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corn Futures 
 
Chicago Board 
Of Trade 
Soybean 
Futures 
Chicago board 
of Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commercial Hedgers Index Traders 
 
Non reported Money Managers 
 
Source: Elaboration on CFTC data (Commitments of Traders supplemental report). 
 
 
 
 
 
7  Computed as the ratio of the absolute value of the net position of each category to the 
sum of the absolute values of the net positions of all categories. 
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3. Previous empirical studies 
 
 
Several studies have attempted to assess the impact of financial 
investments on agricultural commodity prices. Gilbert (2009) tested 
several commodities’ price dynamics in order to find evidence of 
speculative bubbles caused by feedback trading or by index trading. 
Only in a few commodity markets – in particular soybean and copper 
– did his models point to a speculative bubble caused by extrapolative 
expectations, while in many he finds evidence of a bubble caused by 
index traders. Other studies investigate the issue using Granger 
causality tests. In particular, Hernandez and Torero (2010) show that 
futures prices lead spot prices more often than the reverse, while Irwin 
et al. (2009) find that index funds’ positions across futures markets 
have no impact on relative price changes across those markets. More 
closely related to our article are the works of Tang and Xiong (2010) 
and  Buyuksahin and  Robe  (2010).  The  latter  uses  non-public data 
from the US Market Authority (CFTC) to show that the correlations 
between the returns of investable commodities and equity indices 
increase amid greater participation by hedge funds. Tang and Xiong, 
on the other hand, find that since the early 2000s futures prices of 
non-energy  commodities in  the  US  became  increasingly  correlated 
with oil, and that this trend is systematically more pronounced for 
commodities included in the two most popular commodity indices, 
which suggests that index traders may have played an important role 
in affecting commodity prices. 
 
 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
 
In this section new empirical evidence is presented in support of the 
hypothesis that index traders’ investments have affected wheat price 
dynamics in recent years. In particular, I focus on Hard Red Winter 
Wheat, the most traded wheat in international spot markets. According to 
the FAO, Hard Red Winter (HRW) is the benchmark for international 
wheat prices. 
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4.1. The time-series og futures price 
 
 
I have used historical data from the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBT) to construct a weekly weighted average futures price for HRW 
wheat, with weights proportional to the transaction volume of each 
contract (see Appendix 1). A preliminary analysis of this futures price 
time-series  revealed  the  following  relevant  characteristics:  (1)  the 
variable in levels is not stationary, while its first difference logarithmic 
transformation is stationary; (2) there is a first-order positive serial 
correlation; (3) there is autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity;8 (4) 
The error distribution carries more weight in the tails than a normal 
distribution, so it is better approximated by a Student-t. These aspects 
were highlighted by formal tests (described in Appendix 2). 
 
4.2. The correlation between wheat prices, US stock market returns and 
crude oil prices 
 
The analysis presented here is based on the evolving correlations 
between wheat price fluctuations, US stock market returns and oil prices. 
I  test  the  hypothesis that  index traders’ investment influenced HRW 
wheat price dynamics, linking them to US stock market returns and to oil 
price fluctuations. If this hypothesis holds, we should find that in recent 
years wheat price dynamics have become increasingly correlated to oil 
price movements and stock market returns, and that these correlations 
have been caused by a correlation between these two variables and the 
index tracked by commodity index funds. I use returns on the S&P 500 
index as a proxy for US stock market returns, and Brent crude oil price 
changes as an indicator of oil price movements. 
Beginning in  20079   wheat  futures  price  dynamics  are  positively 
related to the returns of the equity index S&P500. This correlation is still 
 
8 A time-series presents conditional heteroskedasticity, or volatility clusters, if there is an 
alternation between periods of higher and lower volatility. 
9 I chose 2007 as the breakpoint date on the basis of a QLR test for parameter instability 
and structural change with unknown change point (based on Andrews, 2003). The QLR 
test (figure 7) for regression n. 1 estimated on the whole sample (1986-2011) indicated 
2008 as the most probable breakpoint date, but it suggested that the correlation between 
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significant if we include in the equation, as control variables, the US 
Dollar exchange rate10 (measured by the Trade Weighted Exchange Index 
calculated by  the Federal Reserve) and a  dummy accounting for the 
global recession of 2008-2009 (regression n. 3 in table 2), but it fades 
away when we control for the returns of the commodity index S&P- 
GSCI, the most tracked by commodity index funds (regression n. 5). In 
other words, the linkage between wheat price movements and stock 
market returns is spurious, and it is determined by the commodity index 
S&P-GSCI, the most tracked by commodity index traders. 
An analogous result holds for the correlation between wheat price 
and oil price. Since 2007 this correlation becomes highly significant, and 
this result is robust to the inclusion of control variables such as the US 
Dollar exchange rate index, the dummy accounting for global recession, 
and gasoline price (regression n. 4). In this case, gasoline price is used as 
a further control variable, in order to account for the effect of biofuel 
production in linking wheat price to oil price (it is gasoline price, and not 
crude oil price, which determines the profitability of biofuels). Even in 
this case, the correlation fades away if we include in the regression the 
S&P-GSCI commodity index (regression n. 6), suggesting that even the 
correlation between wheat price and oil price is spurious, with the most 
tracked commodity index as the confounding variable. 
The estimates in table 2 were obtained from a Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (Garch 1,1) with Student-t 
error distribution. I chose this model in order to take account of the 
presence of conditional heteroskedasticity and of the non-normal 
distribution of wheat price returns. 
 
 
 
 
wheat price and stock market returns has gradually developed during the second half of 
the last decade. An analogous result was found for the correlation between wheat price 
and oil price dynamics (figure 8). 
10 I control for the USD exchange rate because it is related to both US stock market 
dynamics  and  international  commodity  prices.  This  control  may  be  excessive,  for 
financial  investors  consider  investing  in  commodities  as  an  insurance  against  USD 
exchange rate fluctuations, and/or as a bet on the appreciation/depreciation of the dollar. 
Furthermore, most hedge funds and index traders are probably active in both commodities 
and currencies trading. 
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Table 2 – Correlation between HRW wheat futures price, US equity index S&P500 and Brent oil price, 
GARCH(1,1)-t model 
Dependent variable: HRW wheat futures price 
 1991-2006    2007-2011  
(Regression No.) (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.0007 0.0007  0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 (0.39) (0.45)  (0.44) (0.15) (0.72) (0.23) 
AR(1) 0.18*** 0.18***  0.13** 0.11* 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.048) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
US EQUITY INDEX -0.04 -  0.26* - 0.07 - 
 (0.45)   (0.055)  (0.61)  
BRENT OIL PRICE - 0.02  - 0.13** - 0.01 
  (0.37)   (0.02)  (0.85) 
US DOLLAR -0.16 -0.20*  -0.96*** -1.1*** -0.80*** -0.88*** 
 (0.14) (0.10)  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.001) 
DUMMY - -  -0.006 -0.01* -0.003 -0.009 
    (0.33) (0.06) (0.59) (0.12) 
GASOLINE PRICE - -0.02  - -0.19** - -0.19** 
  (0.67)   (0.04)  (0.03) 
S&P-GSCI - -  - - 0.28*** 0.29*** 
COMMODITY INDEX      (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Regression Statistics 
N 840 836  227 227 227 227 
Adjusted R2 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)  0.17 (0.14) 0.19 (0.17) 0.22 (0.19) 0.24 (0.22) 
F-stat 5.3 7.89  5.5 10.1 6.8 11.35 
  (0.00000)  (0.000003)  (0.000002)  (0.000000)  (0,000000)  (0.000000)   
Note: p-values in parentheses. The coefficients for the conditional variance are not reported for reasons of parsimony. Coefficients estimates are noted as 
significant at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels. For 2011 the data only cover the first four months. Coefficients that are significantly different from 
0 at the 10% level are noted in bold print. All variables are expressed in first differences of the natural logarithm. Data sources are listed in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 7 – QLR test statistic for the US EQUITY INDEX coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – QLR test statistic for the BRENT OIL PRICE coefficient 
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Figure 9 – The dummy variable accounting for the global recession 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: DUMMYt = 1 if week t is in the period shaded in blue; DUMMYt = 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
The estimates in table 2 were obtained from a Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (Garch 1,1) with Student-t 
error distribution. I chose this model in order to take account of the 
presence of conditional heteroskedasticity and of the non-normal 
distribution of wheat price returns. 
These results suggest that commodity index traders have affected 
wheat price dynamics, linking them to stock market dynamics and to the 
price of oil, which is the main component of all commodity indices. The 
evolution of the coefficient of the US dollar exchange rate is also notable. 
While in the period 1991-2006 it is -0.20 and barely significant, in 2007- 
2011 it is unitary and highly significant. Since 2007, in other words, for 
every percentage decrease in the US dollar exchange rate index, the price 
of HRW wheat has tended to increase by a percentage point. Controlling 
for  the  commodity  index  this  negative  elasticity  decreases  but  still 
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remains  high  (-0.80),  suggesting  that  this  relation  is  only  partly 
determined by index traders. 
 
4.3. Interpretation of results 
 
 
The empirical analysis presented suggests that commodity index 
traders have played a significant role in affecting wheat price fluctuations 
in recent years. In particular they seem to have linked wheat price 
dynamics to US equity market returns and to oil price movements. As 
shown in table 2, the commodity index (S&P-GSCI) tracked by most 
commodity index funds is the confounding variable that determines the 
linkages between wheat price dynamics and stock market returns, as well 
as between wheat price dynamics and oil price movements. 
Indeed, the fact that the correlation between wheat price dynamics 
and stock market returns appears to be mediated by the returns of the 
S&P-GSCI commodity index is consistent with the hypothesis that index 
traders determine these correlations. As stated in section 2, index traders’ 
demand for futures contracts depends on their own expectations about the 
future returns of the commodity index they are tracking, and on the 
present and future fluctuations of the other financial markets in which 
they operate (this makes sense if one thinks that index traders are active 
at   the   same   time   in   equity,  agricultural  commodity  and   energy 
commodity markets; it is difficult to believe that their strategies in the 
different markets in which they operate can be independent from each 
other). Thus, the correlation between wheat price dynamics and stock 
market returns is not a direct one, but a spurious one: the returns of the 
S&P-GSCI commodity index are correlated with stock market returns, 
and in turn wheat price fluctuations are correlated to the S&P-GSCI index 
returns. 
In interpreting the positive sign of the correlation between wheat 
price and US stock market returns, I argue that when stocks’ market value 
increases,  diversification  incentives  induce  investors  to  move  some 
money into commodities (Tang and Xiong, 2010). The positive sign of 
the relation between oil price and wheat price is probably due to the way 
commodity  index  funds  work.  When  the  oil  price  increases,  they 
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automatically increase their investments in  all  the other commodities 
included in the index, in order not to alter the fixed weights. 
The US dollar exchange rate appears to have had a huge impact on 
recent wheat price dynamics. This relationship was present even in the 
previous period, and its sign is negative. This is consistent with the fact 
that commodities are priced in dollars, so we expect exporters to raise 
prices when the dollar depreciates, especially in oligopolistic markets, in 
order to keep (ceteris paribus) real prices fixed. However, the impact of 
the US dollar exchange rate became remarkably stronger after 2007, so 
new  factors  must  have  stepped  in.  We  can  suppose  that  financial 
investors played a role, because they see commodities as a hedge against 
US dollar depreciation. The estimates presented in table 2 show that only 
a minor part of this influence can be attributed to index traders. We can 
suppose that money managers were more influential in this regard, 
because they are more reactive to macroeconomic signals, but there may 
even have been other factors behind the relationship, which leaves room 
for further research. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
By highlighting the influence of index traders on wheat price 
dynamics this  work  aims  to  contribute to  the  debate  on  the  role  of 
financial markets in recent food price swings, and on the need for better 
regulated commodity futures markets. The empirical analysis presented 
suggests that financial investors played an important role in affecting 
wheat price fluctuations in recent years, by linking them to US equity 
market returns and to oil price movements. 
In my view the data, facts and empirical findings presented here and 
in  many  other  studies  (see  for  example  UNCTAD,  2011;  Tang  and 
Xiong, 2010; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2010; IATP, 2011; Gilbert, 2009; 
Masters  and  White,  2008)  make  a  strong  case  for  a  new  wave  of 
regulation on commodity derivatives markets. The economic and human 
costs of recent commodity price fluctuations have been dramatically high, 
with a strong negative worldwide impact on poverty and food security. I 
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agree with Jayati Ghosh (2011) when she advocates the application of the 
precautionary principle on this matter. In the presence of significant, if 
not conclusive, evidence that the growth of financial speculative 
transactions contributed to recent agricultural price fluctuations, it is the 
responsibility of regulators to act to reverse the process of deregulation of 
commodity derivatives markets that allowed the financialization to 
happen. Position limits should be increased again, and commodity index 
traders should not be exempted from them (as they have been since 
1991). The jurisdiction of market authorities should be extended to OTC 
transactions,   and   to   markets   which   are   now   almost   completely 
unregulated (such as the ones in London). The Dodd-Frank act, recently 
approved in the US, is a step in this direction in that it provides for the 
centralization and regulation of OTC transactions. It remains to be seen 
how it will be implemented by the US Market Authority (the CFTC). 
Moreover, coordination between market authorities, coupled with the 
imposition of analogous rules in all the main commodity exchanges, 
would be necessary to impede investors bypassing rules and limits simply 
by trading the same commodity on exchanges elsewhere. 
Commodity derivatives were created to stabilize commodity price 
dynamics. As a result of their uncontrolled expansion, they now appear to 
be a factor of destabilization. In the end, what is being called for by many 
academics, institutions and NGOs is simply the application of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, a US law approved in 1936, which states that 
it is the task of regulators to “diminish, eliminate or prevent excessive 
speculation causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in the price of a 
commodity”. 
 
 
Appendix 1 - Data and sources 
 
The average weekly futures price was calculated as a weighted 
average of the prices of the different contracts traded in each week, with 
weights proportional to the trading volumes of each contract. Formally: 
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where Pwheatt is average weekly  futures price of w eek t; ௜ܲ is price of  
contract i in week t; Voli is trading volume for contract i in week t; N is 
overall trading volume in week i. 
 
 
Figure A1 – HRW average weekly futures prices and percentage changes 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on KCBT data. Hard Red Winter wheat futures prices were downloaded from 
the Kansas City Board of Trade website at the URL http://www.kcbt.com/historical_data.asp. 
 
Figure A2 – S&P500 index in levels and in percentage changes 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on S&P data. Available online at the URL: http://www.cboe.com/SPX. 
Note: The S&P 500 index, used by countless empirical works as a proxy for the US equity market 
performance, is available from the Standard & Poor’s website. We chose it among other indices 
because it is representative of the whole market.  
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Figure A3 – US dollar Trade Weighted Exchange Index in levels and in 
percentage changes 
 
 
 
Note: Weighted average of the exchange rate of the US dollar with the currencies of the main 
commercial partners of the US. 
Source: Elaboration on US Federal Reserve data. US Dollar exchange rate dynamics are measured by 
the Trade Weighted Exchange Index calculated by the Federal Reserve. Available online at the URL: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TWEXM. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4 – Brent crude oil price in levels and in percent changes 
 
  
 
Source: Elaboration on US Energy Information Administration data. Available online at the URL 
http://tonto.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=W 
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Figure A5 – Gasoline price in the US in levels and in percentage changes 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on US Energy Information Administration data. Available online at the  
URL:http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html 
 
 
 
Figure A6 – S&P-GSCI index in levels and in percentage changes 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Goldman Sachs data. S&P-GSCI commodity index returns comes from 
Goldman Sachs and were downloaded from the website “Wikiposit”, at the URL: 
http://wikiposit.org /w?action=dl&dltypes=comma%20separated&sp=weekly&uid=WP204FB. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 - Time-series of the weekly average futures price 
 
 
Visual inspection (fig ure A7) sugge sts that the ti me-series of the  
average weekly futures price of Hard Red Winter wheat is non-stationary, 
i.e. the probabilit y distribution for t he empirical observations does not  
seem to be constant o ver time. Mean, standard deviatio n and 
 Do financial investors affect the price of wheat?  103 
autocorrelation parameters seem to change with time. In particular, 
“eyeballing” the data suggests that the m ean and variance of the  
distribution increase in the most recent part of the sample. Clearly, these 
elements should be investigated further through formal tests. 
 
 
Figure A7 – Weekly weighted average of the futures price of HRW wheat, 
January 1986-April 2011 ($/bushel) 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on KCBT historical data (available online at the URL: http://www.kcbt.com 
/historical_data.asp). 
 
 
 
Non-stationarity was confirmed by an augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
for the presence of a unit-root. Without intercept and trend, the one-sided 
p-value for the null hypothesis that the series has a unit root  is 74%. The 
series is non-stationary.  We select ed a second-order autoregressive 
structure, AR(2), on the basis of the minimization of the Schwarz Info 
Criterion (or BIC, Bayesian Info Criterion). The result is robust to the use 
of the Akaike Info Criterion (AIC), which would select a 24-lags 
autoregressive structure, AR(24) (in this cas e the one-sided p-value for  
the null of non-stationarity is 68%). 
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Table A1 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root (series in levels) 
 
Null Hypothesis: FUTURES has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=25) 
   t-Statistic  Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  0.193693  0.7425 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.566031  
 5% level  -1.940970  
 10% level  -1.616601  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
 
 
To eliminate non-stationarity in the da ta, we express the series as 
first-differenced natural logarithms, i.e.  we take the rate of change of th e 
series. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test (without trend and intercept and 
with an AR(1) structure selected by the BIC criterion) rejects at any 
conventional significance level the null h ypothesis of a unit  
autoregressive root. T he result is robus t to t he use of the AIC criterion 
instead of the BIC to select the number of lags. 
Several previous stud ies have shown that the empirical 
distribution of commodity futures p rice changes is ty pically not 
normal but leptokurtic, i.e. it has a more acute peak around the mean 
and fatter tails, and so it is better approximated by a Student-t 
distribution than by  a normal dist ribution (Kang and Brorsen, 1995). 
Other typical main features pointed out by   the literature on 
commodity  futur es  p rice  changes are asymmetry and auto-
correlation (Taylor, 1985; Yang and Brorsen, 1993; Kan g and 
Brorsen, 1995). The empirical dist ribution of the first-differenced 
logarithms of our we ekly average HRW wheat futures price fits this 
description fairly well (see figure A8). 
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Table A2 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root (series in ∆݈݊) 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLOG(FUTURES) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG = 25) 
   t-Statistic  Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -37.54431  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.566031  
 5% level  -1.940970   
 10% level  -1.616601  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
 
 
Figure A8 – Empirical distribution of the logarithmic changes of the 
weekly weighted average HRW wheat futures price (sample: January 
1986 – April 2011) 
 
 
Observations 1,328 
Mean 0.0008 
Median -0.0026 
Max. 0.13 
Min. -0.12 
Std. Dev. 0.028 
Skewness 0.31 
Kurtosis 4.71 
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The autocorrelation function (ACF) an d the partial autocorrelation 
function (PACF) of the series and the corresponding Lju ng-Box Q–
Statistics confirm the presence of serial correlation. The structure  of the 
autocorrelation is not clear-cut, but  overall it is suggestive of an AR(1) 
model: the P ACF presents an isolated peak on the first lag, even if the 
ACF function declines quite sharply after the fi rst lag, instead of 
decreasing gradually as we would expect in the case of an  AR(1) 
structure. However, the AR(1) seems to fit the time-series better than any 
other model, with a highly  significant first-order autoregressive 
coefficient, and with no serial correlation left in the res iduals. 
Furthermore, the A R(1) model is selected by the Bay esian Information 
Criterion (BIC). 
The ACF and PACF of the squared residuals of the AR(1) equation 
suggest that the series pre sents conditional heteroskedasticity (see table 
A4). This is confirmed by a McLeod-Li  (1983) test using a lag length of 
four quarters: the value of the F-statistic is 36.6 and the coefficients of the 
first three lags are highly  significant, thus the null hypothesis of no  
conditional heteroskedasticity is rejected at any conventional level.  
Using the AR(1) model for the mean and an ARCH(1) model for the 
conditional variance we still find significant serial  correlation in the  
squared standardized residuals, so ARCH(1) specification is not sufficient 
to capture all of the dynamics of the condit ional variance. A 
GARCH(1,1) would seem  to be more appropriate, since both the  
coefficients of the Arch and Garch te rms in the v ariance equation are 
highly significant, and there is no  serial correlation left in t he 
standardized squared residuals. 
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Table A3 – ACF, PACF and Q-Statistics for the logarithmic changes of 
the weekly weighted average HRW wheat futures price (sample: January 
1986 – April 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108   
Table A4 – ACF, PACF and Q-Statistics for the squared residuals of the 
AR(1) model (sample: January 1986 – April 2011) 
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